Introduction
The EUʼs external policies have long been marked by a political, institutional, and legal dichotomy between, on the one hand, external economic policies and on, the other, foreign and security policies, developed within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). External economic policies have for a long time been the subject of a strong EU presence, in particular in the field of trade, which is an exclusive EU competence. Those policies involve not just the governments of the Member States, acting within the Council, but also the EUʼs supranational institutions, the Commission, the Court of Justice, and increasingly also the European Parliament. In fact, the EUʼs import and export regimes have been harmonized, indeed have been uniform, since the early nineties, with cars from Japan being one of the last sectors to become part of this uniform regime ઃ) . By contrast, the Treaty of Maastricht introduced the CFSP as a separate EU pillar, governed by intergovernmental decision-making, and largely excluding the EUʼs supranational institutions. This has meant that the CFSP, though as a policy also predicated with the word ʻcommonʼ，has been very different in character from for example the common commercial policy. As an illustration, simply consider, for a moment, the contrast between the EU acting with a single voice on matters of trade, be it in the WTO, or in bilateral 『日本 EU 学会年報』第31号，pp. 1-12 平成23年 1 negotiations, for example with Japan and the EUʼs policy in 2003 towards the international crisis leading to the invasion of Iraq : you will not easily find EU documents in 2003 on that crisis, for the simple reason that there was no EU common policy in any form or shape.
That does not mean, however, that the CFSP is an empty shell. The EUʼs foreign and security policy has developed and grown, to the point that the EU now regularly sends military missions to certain countries for the purpose of peace-making and peace-keeping. It is also very active in the field of economic, financial, and so-called smart sanctions, and has a strong counter-terrorism policy.
The pillar structure of the EU effectively created two parallel EU administrations. The Commission departments, responsible for trade matters, development co-operation, and external economic relations. And the There is however more at hand than mere standard inter -institutional rivalry. The EUʼs external policies are marked by some very prominent constitutional birth defects, which are difficult to remove. The CFSP aspires to cover "all areas of foreign policy" (Article 24(1) TEU), which for any non-informed observer would include trade relations and development co-operation. However, the policies in those areas have been constitutionally separated from the CFSP, and have been much stronger and effective than the CFSP. The latter was developed as a largely supplementary external policy, complementing the EUʼs strong external economic policies. Rather than foreign policy driving trade policy, one could have the impression that trade policy was driving foreign policy. The differences in decision-making mechanisms are very much part of that constitutional separation, and there has always been and continues to However, one may have doubts whether Kissingerʼs alleged exclamation ever became famous outside Europe. Moreover, the real issue is not so much whom the Americans need to call within the EU institutions (even today there is no single number, as we also have the Presidents of the European Council and of the Commission). The real issue is whether they call the EU or national capitals, as the Iraq crisis made crystal-clear. It is a great idea to bridge the institutional gap, but it is not obvious that that in itself will lead to a more effective, and a more common European foreign policy.
As is well known, the Constitution for Europe failed. But it was nicely repackaged as the Lisbon Treaty, after having been stripped of its constitutional terminology and imagery. The Minister had to go, and in came the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. However, the Lisbon Treaty did not really attempt to remove the constitutional birth defects which have marked EU external policies. The CFSP pillar is still standing, separate from the EUʼs other external policies. There has been some constitutional change as regards the relationship between these various policies. The main one is that EU external action is now subject to a single set of constitutional objectives, which should inspire, and indeed direct, all of the EUʼs external policies.
But there is still a fundamental treaty provision, now Article 40 TEU, which aims to ensure that the intergovernmental CFSP does not trespass on the EUʼs supranational external economic policies. The only change there is that the demarcation now works in both directions. What this for example means, in legal terms, is that it is not clear whether the EU is capable of adopting a single legal act which has both CFSP and non-CFSP elements : the decision-making mechanisms continue to be very different, as well as the available legal instruments. External competences continue to be divided.
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The High Representative It therefore remains to be seen whether the High Representative office will be able to treat some of the constitutional birth defects. She will in any event be hard-pressed to find time to develop the right treatment.
Indeed, the job description of the High Representative is most demanding, and one may have doubts whether a single office is capable of performing all of the assigned tasks.
The powers of the High Representative are much more extensive than those of her pre-Lisbon predecessor. An analysis of the provisions of the TEU referring to the High Representative show that there are, broadly speaking, five types of powers (understood in a broad sense as encompassing responsibilities and duties).
The first is a power to make proposals. Article 18 (2) TEU, which speaks about the office in general terms, provides that the High Representative shall contribute by her proposals to the development of the CFSP.
Further provisions refer to more specific rights of proposal. Article 22 (2) TEU, concerning European Council decisions on the Unionʼs strategic interests and objectives, provides that the High Representative and the 
The European External Action Service
The High Representative heads the new European External Action Service, which is in the process of being set up. From now on, the EU will have its own State Department, Foreign Office, or Ministry for 
Conclusions
What conclusions can we draw at this point in time making. There is however a risk that, instead of simplifying matters, the new framework has merely created a set of new institutional actors, and may not lead to greater interinstitutional harmony.
The institutional innovations have led to a frantic year in Brussels, in which the focus has mainly been on putting flesh to the new institutional bones. That process will certainly take some more time, but at some point the EU should move away from its institutional navel-gazing and focus on what role it can play in the world. 『日本 EU 学会年報』第31号，平成23年આ月
